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SITUATION

I

BELLIGERENTS IN NEUTRAL WATERS
States X and Y are at ·war. Other states are neutral.
"fhere is a condition of political turmoil in state B, and
the local authorities are 'veak and incapable of enforcing
·order within the territory o:£ B.
(a) A cruiser o:£ X, the X ane, pursues a merchant
vessel o:£ Y, the You•ng, into a port of B. vVhat actiou
rna y it take there ~
(b) ""\Vhat action might be taken if the pursued vessel
were a vessel o:£ 'var o:£ state Y, the Yarrow.~
(c) What action should the X ane take if it learns that
a radio station belonging to state B is transmitting Inilitary messages for the Y arroto'?
SOLUTION

(a) T'he X a1ne should take no action against the Y o111ng
merely because the 17 01Jm.g has entered the port of B.
In case the Xane is convinced that the Young is abusing
its privileges in B because o:£ the weakness o:£ the local
.authorities, the Xane may visit and search the Young
.as a basis for determining subsequent action.
(b) I:£ the Yarrow· remains in port more than 24 hour3,
unless for the lawful taking on o:£ coal or supplies or
making repairs to render the ship sea,vorthy, the commander o:£ the X ane may request the authorities o:£ state
B to intern the Yarrow.
(c) The commander o:£ the X (Jfne should protest
against military use o:£ radio; and i:£ no co1npetent local
.authority is present, should take such 1neasures as 1nay
.be least arbitrary to prevent its use.
1
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BELLIGERENTS IN NEUTRAL 'VATERS
NOTES

Belligerents in neutral jumdiotion.-In general the
action of belligerents 'vithin neutral jurisdiction has year
by year become more and more restricted. New and
varied conditions, ne'v instruments and agencies of warfare, and other changes have given rise to problems for
'vhich conventions and regulations have endeavored to
provide.
It is no\v generally admitted that a neutral should nut
permit its territory to be used as a base by a belligerent,
but it is not always clear as to 'vhat constitutes such use
and illustrations of this fact may be found in practically
every modern 'var.
As a state is, in consequence of the allegiance of its
subjects, under a degree of responsibility for their acts~
these acts therefore must be supervised 'vithin and to a
degree outside its jurisdiction.
Early Amerioan attitude.-The United States was
early confronted with conditions which required that the
position of the Governn1ent be defined. The acts of M.
Genet made some declaration of policy necessary. Washington issued a proclamation on April 22, 1793, stating
that,
'Vhereas it armears that a state of war exists between Austria,
Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of
the one part, and France on the other; and the duty and interest
of the United States require that they should with sincerity and
good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and ilnpartial
toward the belligerent powers:
I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the
disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid
towards those Powers respectively; and to exhort and warn the
citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to contravene
such disposition :
And I do hereby also make known, that whosoever of the
citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishInent or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said Powers, or by
carr~ring to any of them those articles which are deemed contra-
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band by the nwdern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or forfeiture;
and further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to
whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against
all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, Yiolate the law of nations, with respect to the
Powers at war, or any of them. (1 Amer. State Papers, For. Rel.,
p. 140.)

This proclamation sho\ved a disposition to keep the
conduct of citizens of the United States clearly \vithin
what \Vas at that tin1e the unquestioned boundaries of
proper neutral conduct. The action of belligerents within 1\..merican jurisdiction gave rise to controversy and the
Cabinet drew up a set of regulations in August 1793, as
follo·ws:
RULES ADOPTED BY THE CABINET AS TO THE EQUIPMENT OF VESSELS

IN THE PORTS OF THE UNITED STATES BY BELLIGERENT POWERS,
AND PROCEEDINGS ON 'THE CONDUCT OF THE F'R.E NOH l\1INISTER.•
AUGUST 3D, 1793.

1. The original arming and equipping of vessels in the ports of

the United States by any of the belligerent parties for military
service offensive or defensive is deemed unlawful.
2. Equipments of 1nerchant vessels by either of the belligerent
parties, in the ports of the United States, purely for the accom
modation of them as such, is deemed lawful.
3. Equipments, in the ports of the United States, of vessels of.
war in the immediate service of the government of any of the
belligerent parties, which, if done to other vessels, would be of a
doubtful nature, as being applicable either to commerce or war,
are deemed lawful; except those which shall have made prize of
the subjects, people, or property of France, coming with their
prizes into the ports of the United States, pursuant to the
seventeenth article of our treaty of amity and c01nmerce with
France.
4. Equipments in the ports of the United States, by any of the
pa1·ties at war with France, of vessels fitted for merchandise and
war, whether with or without commissions, which are doubtful in
their nature, as being applicable either to commerce or war, are
deemed lawful, except those which shall be made prize, &c.
5. Equipn1ents of any of the vessels of France in the ports of
the UnHed States, which are doubtful in their nature, as being
applicable to commerce or war, are deemed lawful.
4
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6. Equipments of eYery kind in the ports of the United States,
of privateers of the powers at war with France, are deemed·
lawful [unlawful].
7. Equipments of vessels in the ports of the United States,
which are of a nature solely adapted to war, are deemed unlawful; except those stranded or wrecked, as mentioned in the eighteenth article of our treaty with France, the sixteenth of our
treaty with the United Netherlands, the ninth of our treaty with
Prussia; and except those mentioned in the nineteenth article of
our treaty with France, the seventeenth of our treaty with the
United Netherlands, the eighteenth of our treaty with Prussia.
8. Vessels of either of the parties not armed, or armed previous.
to their coming into the ports of the United States, which shall
not have infringed any of the foregoing rules, may lawfully engage or enlist their own subjects or citizens, not being inhabitantsof the United States; except privateers of the powers at war with
E.,rance, and except those Yessels which shall have made prize, &c.
The foregoing rules haYing been considered by us at seYeral
meetings, and being now unanimously approved, they are submitted to the President of the United States.
THOMAS JEFFERSON.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
HENRY I{NOX.
EDMUND RANDOLPH.

{7 Moore, International Law Digest, p. 891.)

Randolph, Secretary of State, in April 1795 sent t(}
the Govern1nent of the several states the following circular instructions:
As it is contrary to the law of nations that any of the belligerent powers should comn1it hostility on the waters which are
subject to the exclusiYe jurisdiction of the United States, so
ought not the ships of war, belonging to any belligerent power,
to take a station in those wa.ters in order to aarry on hostile
expeditions from the·nae. I do myself the honor, therefore, of
requesting of ~Tour excellency, in the na1ne of the President of the
United States, that, as often as a fleet, squadron, or ship, of any
belligerent nation, shall clearly and unequivocally use the riYers,
01 other waters of ---------- as a station, in order to aarry on
hostile expeditions from thenae, you will cause to be notified to·
the commander thereof that the President deems such conduct
to be contrary to the rights of our neutrality; and that a demand
of retribution will be urged upon their government for prizeswhich n1ay be made in consequence thereof. A standing order
tt' this effect 1nay probably be aclYantageously placed in the hands.
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of some confidential officer of the militia, and I must entreat you
to instruct him to write by the mail to this Department, immediately upon the happening of any case of the kind. (Ibid., 934.)

This circular he subsequently explained didnot request that vessels, using our waters as a hostile station
should be ordered to depart-

butonly that notice should be given to them of our intended demand
upon their Government. An order to depart would be inconsistent with the letter of the 9th of Sept. 1793, which concedes to
them our ports as a refuge in case of necessity and a resort for
comfort or convenience, without limiting the time of their stay.
(Ibid., 935.)

Essential idea of basf3.-The essential idea in base
seems to be a place supporting the military force of the
belligerent. The support may be of varying character.
It may be a place from which fuel is drawn, a place to
which retreat may be made for security, a place in ,vhich
repairs may be made~ etc. There would seem therefore
to be a reason for the consideration of the question as
to when a neutral port may be said to become a base.
l~y the generally accepted law of war and neutrality,
vessels of war of a belligerent may take a specified
amount of coal at· certain intervals within neutral jurisdiction, repairs to a limited extent may be allowed, sojourn for a period is permitted, etc. To furnish fuel to
belligerent vessels o:f war, to allow repairs, to permit
sojourn beyond the prescribed limits, may render the
neutral open to charges of nonfulfillment of neutral
obligations.
The neutral by modern regulations is under obligations
to use " due diligence " or " the means at its disposal to
prevent " violations of its neutrality by vessels of w·ar
and such use of force may not be considered unfriendly.
Essential idea of base as regards private vessels.-Private vessels in the time of war as in the tiine of peace are
generally free to enter and to use neutral ports. A private vessel may, however, be subject to the control of a
belligerent that it may not, in an exceptional case, use a
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i1eutral port in such 1nanner as to constitute the port a
base.
Presun~ption as to base.-The presumption would naturally be that a vessel of 'var of a belligerent would, if
unrestrained, use a neutral port as a base. The presumption would be that a private vessel entering a neutral port
would be entering for innocent purposes.
The obligation of the neutral state would arise immediately on the entrance of a vessel of war of a belligerent
to guard against the use of the port as a base.
The obligation as to a private vessel would arise only
when there was reasonable evidence of such use.
There is, therefore, a good ground for difference in the
regulations as to private and otlier ships.
Protection afforded by neu1tra1l juris'diction.-Within
neutral jurisdiction no act of 'var should take place.
Here, therefore~ a belligerent vessel is more safe than
on the high sea or 'vithin its own ports for in either o!
these areas the belligerent vessel may be attacked. The
natural consequence is that the belligerents desire to
make such use of neutral 'vaters as is permitted. The
neutral state, in order to maintain neutrality, is obliged
to make kno,vn the rules of conduct which it proposes
to follo,v. rrhere have been so many changes in the
1nethod of "·arfare that early rules 1nay not be suffi- _
ciently d~tailed to cover ne'v conditions. The idea of'
the use of an area 'vithin neutral jurisdiction as a base
has gradually developed, though there is not an agreeInent as to what constitutes a base.
Oa.se of the "Alabama."-The idea of "base of operations " as set forth in The Hague Convention of 1907
'vas influenced by the statement set forth in the second
rule of the Treaty of vVashington of 1871, relating to
the Alaban~a clai1ns.. These rules provide that a neutral
governrnent is bound. First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming,
or equipl1iug, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable grouwl to believe is intended to cruise or to carry
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on war against a Power with whi<:h it is at peace; and also ta
use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction
of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such
vessel having been specially adapted, in "·hole or in part, within
such jurisdiction, to warlike use.
Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make
use of its ports or waters as a base of naval operations against
the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or aug1nentation of
military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.
Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters,
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties. [1 Moore, International Arbitrations, p. 550.]

It w·as admitted in the case for the United States that
the sale of arms or of military supplies in the 'Yay o:f
ordinary commerce "\Vas not prohibited, but the use of a
neutral port should not be allo"red for a belligerent " for
the rene,val or augmentation o£ such military supplies or
ar1ns for the naval operations referred to in the rule."
The case further stated that,
The ports or waters of the neutral are not to be made the ba~
of naval operations by a belligerent. Vessels of war 1nay come
and go under such rules and regulations as the neutral may prescribe; food and the ordinary stores and supplies of a ship not
of a warlike character n1ay be furnished without question,· in
quantities necessary for immediate wants; the moderate hospitali·
ties which do not infringe upon impartiality may be extende<L
but no act shall be done to make the neutral port a base of
operations. Ammunition and military stores for cruisers cannot
be obtained there; coal cannot be stored there for successive
supplies to the same ·vessel, !!Or can it be furnished or obtained in
~uch supplies; prizes cannot be brought there for condemnation.
The repairs that humanity demands can be given, but no repai:rs
should add to the strength or efficiency of a vessel beyond what is
absolutely necessary to gain the nearest of its own ports. In the
~ame sense are to be taken the clauses relating to the renewal
or augmentation of military supplies or arms and the recruitment
of men. As the vessel enters the port, ·so is she to leave it, with(lUt addition to her effective power of doing injury to the other
belligerent. If her n1agazine is supplied with powder, shot. or
~he·Us ; if new guns are added to her armament; if pistols,
1~1us~ets, or cutlasses, or other implements of destruction are put
on board; if men are recruited; even if, in these days when steam

or
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is a power, an excessive supply of coal is put into her bunkers, the
neutral will have failed in the performance of its duty. [Ibid.,
p. 574.]

The United States enutnerated the certain rules which
it claimed 'vere established:
1. That it is the duty of a neutral to preserve strict and impartial neutrality as to both belligerents during hostilities.
2. That this obligation is independent of municipal law.
3. That a neutral is bound to enforce its municipal laws and
its executive proclamations; and that a belligerent has the right
to ask it to clo so; and also the right to ask to have the powers
conferred upon the neutral by law increased if found insufficient.
4. That a neutral is bound to use due diligence to prevent the
fitting out,· arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any
vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to
cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at
peace.
5. That a neutral is bound to use like diligence to prevent the
construction of such a vessel.
6. That a neutral is bound to use like diligence to prevent
the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to
cruise or carry on war against any power with which it is at
peace, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or
in part, within its jurisdiction to warlike use.
7. That a neutral may not permit ~r suffer either belligerent
to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations
against the other.
8. That a neutral is bound to use due diligence in its ports or
waters to preYent either belligerent from o.btaining there a renewal
or augmentation of military supplies,_ or arms for belligerent
vessels, or the recruitment of men .
9. That when a neutral fails to use all the means in its power
to prevent a breach of the neutrality of its soil or waters, in
any of the foregoing respects, the neutral should make compensation for the injury resulting therefrom.
10. 'l'lm t this obligation is not _discharged or arrested by the
change of the offending ves~el into a pu.blic man-of-war.
11. That this obligation is not discharged by a fraudulent
attempt of the offending vessel to evade the provisions of a local
Jnunicipal law.
12. That the offense will not be deposited so as to release the
liability of the neutral, even by the entry of the offending vessel
into a port of the belligerent, and th~re becoming a n1an-of-war,
if any part of the original fra1Jd co.ntinues to hang about the
vessel. [Ibid .. p. 579.]
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The general propositions laid down in the British case
:are also Yery suggestive and Ina y be cited in :full :
1. A neutral government is bound to exercise due diligence, to
the intent that no place within its territory be made use of by
either belligerent as a base or point of departure for a 1nilitar~r
or naval expedition, or for hostilities by land or sea.
2. A neutral goyernment is not, by force of the above-mentioned
obligation or otherwise, bound to preyent or restrain the sale
within its territory, to a belligerent, of articles contraband of
"\Var, or the 1nanufacture within its territory of such articles to
the order of a belligerent, or the delivery thereof within it~
territory to a belligerent 11urchaser, or the exportation of such
articles from its territory for sale to, or for the use of, a
belligerent.
3. Nor is a neutral goyenunent bound, by force of the aboveInentioned obligation or otherwise, to prohibit or prevent vessels
of war in the sen·ice of a belligerent from entering or remaining
in its ports or waters, or from purchasing provisions, coal, or
()ther supplies, or undergoing repairs therein ; provided that the
same facilities be accorded to both belligerents indifferently; and
provided also that such vessels be not permitted to augment their
n1ilitary force, or increase or renew their supplies of anus or
munitions of war, or of men, wit:1in the neutral territory;
4. The unlawful equipment,. or augmentation of force, of a
belligerent vessel within neutral waters being an offense against
the neutral pow·er, it is the right of the neutral power to release
prizes taken by 1neans or by the aid of such equipment or augmentation of force, if found within its jurisdiction.
5. It has been the practice of maritiine powe·rs, when at 'var,
to treat as contraband of war vessels specially adapted for warlike use and fouricl at sea under a neutral flag in course of transportation to a place possessed or occupied by a belligerent. Such
vessels have been held liable to capture and condemnation as
contraband on proof in each case that the destination of the ship
was an enemy's port, and provided there were reasonable grounds
for believing that she was intended to be sold or delivered to or
for the use of the enen1y.
6. Public ships of war in the ser'\rice of a belligerent entering
the ports or waters of a neutral are, by the practice of nations,
exempt from the jurisdiction of a neutral power. To withdraw
or refuse to recognize this exemption without previous notice,
or without such notice to exert, or attempt to exert, jurisdiction
over any such vessel, would be a violation of a common understanding, which all nations are bound by good faith to respect.
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7. A vessel bec01nes a public ship of war by being armeu and
commissioned- that is to say, formally invested by order or under
the authority of a goYerninent with the character of a ship
employed in its naval service and forming part of its marine for
purposes of war. There are no general rules which prescribe
how, where, or in what form the con1missioning must be effected
so as to impress on the vessel the character of a public ship of
war. \Vhat is essential is that the appointment of a designated
officer to the charge and com1nand of a ship likewise designated
be made by the government, or the proper department of it, or
under authority delegated by the government or department, and
that the charge and command of the ship be taken by the officer
so appointed. Customarily a ship is held to be commissioned
when a commissioned officer appointed to her has gone on board
of her and hoisted the colors appropriated to the military marine.
A neutral power may indeed refuse to admit into its own ports
or waters as a public ship of war any belligerent vessel not
commissioned in a specified form or manner, as it may impose
OE such admission any other conditions at its pleasure, provided
the refusal be applied to both belligerents indifferently; but this
should not be done without reasonable notice.
8. The act of commissioning, by which a ship is invested with
the character of a public ship of war, is, for that purpose, valid
and conclusive, notwithstanding that the ship may have been at
the time registered in a foreign country as a ship of that country,.
or 1nay have been liable to process at the suit of a private claimant, or to arrest or forfeiture under the law of a private claimant,
or to arrest or forfeiture under the law of a foreign state. The·
commissioning power, by commissioning her, incorporates her into
its naval force; and by t'l1e "s ame act which withdraws her from
the operation of ordinary legal process assumes the responsibility
for all existing claims which could otherwise haYe been enforced
against her.
9. Due diligence on the part of a sovereign government signifies.
that measure of care which the government is under an international obligation to use for a given purpose. This measure,.
\vhere it has not been defined by international usage or agreement,
i~ to be deduced from the nature of the obligation itself, and from
those consirlerations of justice, equity, and general expediency on
which the law of nations is founded.
10. The measure of care which a government is bound to use in
0rder to preYent within its jurisdiction certain classes of ucts,.
from which harm might accrue to foreign states or their citizens,.
must always (unless specifically determined by usage or agreeInent) be dependent, more or les~, on the surrounding circum-

C.-\.SE OF " ALAB Al\L\."

11

Htances, aud ea11 not be clefiile tl with precision in the fonn of a
general rule. It wculd comtnonlyl howeYer, be unreasonable and
jm1n·acticable to require that it shonlu exceed that which the
goYer1Hne11ts of ciYilized states are accustomed to etnploy in lllatters concerning their own security or that of their own citizens.
That eYen this rneasure of obligation has not been recognized in
1n·actice might be clearly shown by reference to the laws in force
in the vrincipal C'- u11tries of Europe and An1erica. It would be
Pnough, indeed, to refer to the history of son1e of these· countries
during recent periods for proof that great and enlightened states
ha Ye not deen1ed themselYes bound to exert the same vigilance
and employ the same rneans of repression, when enterprises prepared within their own territories endangered the safety of neighboring states, as they would probably have exerted and en1ployed
had their own security been similarly imperiled.
In eYery country where the Executive is subject to the laws.
f oreign states have a right to expect( a) 'That the laws be such as in the exercise of ordinary fore·
sight n1ight reasonably be deemed adequate for the repression ofall acts \Yhich the government is under an international obligation to repress.
(b) ~'hat, so fn r as rnay be necessary for this purpose, the Ia wshe enforced and the legal lWWers of the government exercised.
But for eign states haYe not a right to require, where such
laws exist, that the Executive should overstep them in a particularcase in order to preYent harn1 to foreign states or their citizens;
nor that, in order to pre,·ent harm to foreign states or theilcitizens, the ExecutiYe should act against the persons or property
of incliYicluals, unless Ul10n evidence which would justify it in
so acting if the interests to be protected were its own or those
of its o\vn citizens. Nor are the Jaws or the rnode of judicial
or acllninistra tive procedure which exist in one country to be
applied as constituting a rule or standard of comparison for
any other country. Thus, the rules which exist in Great Britain
as to the admission and probatiYe force of various kinds of testi·
n1ony, the evidence necessary to be produced in certain cases,
the questions proper to be tried by a jury, the functions of the·
ExecutiYe in regard to the prevention and prosecution of offenses,
may differ, as the organization of the magistrature and the distribution of authority among central and local officers also differ,
frmn those which exist in France, Germany, or Italy. Each of
these countries has a right, as wen in matters which concern
foreign states or their citizens as in other matters, to administer
and enforce its own laws in its own forum, and according to its.
own rules and 1nocles of procedure; and foreign states cannot
3628-34--2
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justly c01nplain of this unless it can be clearly shown tlmt the::;e
rules and Ino<les of procedure conflict in any particular with natural justice, or, in other words, with principles commonly acknowl. edged by civilized nations to be of universal obligation.
In connection with the foregoing propositions are to be taken
the three rules stated in Article VI. of the treaty, and accepted
by fier Britannic lVIajesty's government in the 1nanner expressed
in that article." (Ibid. p. 599.)

The Institute of International La,v, "~hich in 1874 and
in 187 5 took into consideration the three rules of the
Treaty of Washington of 1871, adopted in the 1neeting at
The Hague in 1875 the follo"~ing rules:
1. A neutral State which is desirous of remaining on terms of
peace and friendship with the belligerents, and of enjoying the
rights of neutrality, must abstain from taking any part whatever
in the war, by lending n1ilitary assistance to one or both of the
belligerents, and exercise vigilance to 11revent its territory from
becoming a center of organization or point of departure for hostile
expeditions against one or both of the belligerents.
2. Consequently the neutral State cannot, in any manner whatever, put at the disposal of any of the belligerent States, or sell
to them, its war vessels or military transports, nor material from
its arsenals or military stores, for the purpose of assisting it in
prosecuting the war. Furthermore, the neutral State is bound to
exercise vigilance to prevent other persons from placing war
vessels at the disposal of any of the belligerent States in its
ports or in those portions of the sea subject to its jurisdiction.
3. When the neutral State is aware of enterprises or acts of
this kind, incompatible with neutrality, it is bound to take the
necessary n1easures to prevent them, and to prosecute the individuals who violate the duties of neutrality, as the guilty parties.
4. Likewise, the neutral State should not pern1it nor suffer one
of the belligerents to use its ports or waters as a naval base of
operations against the other, or permit Inilitary transports to use
its ports or waters to renew or add to their Inilitary supplies
or arms, or to secure recruits.
5. The mere fact that a hostile act has been committed upon
neutral territory is not sufficient to make the neutral State responsible. Before it can be admitted that it has violated its duty,
it must be shown that there was a hostile intention (dolus), or
manifest negligence ( oulpa) .
6. Only in serious and urgent cases, and only during the existence of war, has the Power injured by a violation of neutral
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-duties the right to consider neutrality as abandoned and to re~ort to force to defend itself against the State which has violated
neutrality.
In cases of a minor character, or where the matter is not urgent,
or after the war is over, complaints of this character should be
~ettled exclusively by arbitration.
7. The arbitral tribunal decides ex cequo et bono on the questions of damages which the neutral State should, by reason of its
responsibility, pay to the injured State, either for the State itself,
or for its nationals ( ressortissants). (Resolutions of the Institute of International Law. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1!>'16, p. 12.)

of Sir Rowndell. Palmer.-In the supplemental argument supporting the British case before the
Geneva tribunal, Sir Roundell Palmer said o:f the expression " base o:f naval operations ", after citing various
authors:
A1"gun-1-ent

The vhrase now in question is a short expression of the principle that neutral territory is not to be used as a place fr01u
'vhich operations of nayal warfare are to be carried into effect:
whether by single ships, or by ships combined in expeditions. It
expresses an accepted rule of international law. Any jurist who
might have been asked whether neutral ports or waters might
be used as a base for naval operations, would have replied that
they might not; and he would have understood the words in the
sense stated above.
The above citations and references furnish at the same tim~:!
the necessary limitations under which the phrase is to be understood. None of these writers question-no writer of authority
has ever questioned-that a belligerent cruiser 1night lawful1y
enter a neutral port, remain there, supply herself with provisions
and other necessities, repair damages sustained from wear and
tear, or in battle, replace (if a sailing-ship) her sails and rigging.
renew (if a steamer) her stock of fuel,. or repair her engines,
repair both her steaming and her sailing power, if capable (as
almost all ships of war now are) of navigating under sail and
under steam, and then issue forth to continue her cruise, or (like
the Alabama at Cherbourg) to attack an enemy. "Ils y sont
admis a s'y procurer les vivres necessaires et a y faire les reparations indispensables pour reprendre la mer et se livrer de nou.veau.
aux operations de l.a uuerre; " (Ortolan : Heffter.) " Puis sortir
librement pour aller livrer de nouveaux combats;" (Hautefeuille.)
The connection between the act done within the neutral terri-
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tory nutl the hostile overation whkll is actually performed out
of it, must (to be within the prohibition) be "proximate"; that
is, they n1ust be connected directly and immediately with OlH~
another. In a ense where a cruiser uses a neutral port to lie in
wait for an enemy, or as a station frmn whence she may seize
upon pels~ing ships, the connection is proximate. But where a
cruiser hns obtained proYisions, sail-cloth, fuel, a new mast, or
a new boiler-plate in the neutral port, the connection betweC!l.
this and any subsequent capture she may 1nake, is not "proxilnate ~', but (in the words of Lord Stowell, quoted by I(ent,
'Vheaton, and other v;rite-rs) "remote." The latter transaction
is "universally tolernted "; the other universally forbidden.
It is evident that if this phrase, "base of operations", were·
to be taken in the wide and loose sense now contended for by
the United States, it might be made to comprehend almost every
possible case in which a belligerent cruiser had taken advantage
of the ordinary hospitalities of a neutral port. It would be in
the po\ver of any belligerent to extend it almost indefinitely, so·
as to fasten unexpected liabilities on the neutral. (Papers relating to Treaty of Washington, vol. 3, p. 434.)

Replies to Si1" Rowndell Palmer.-In the reply of Mr.
I~~varts to the argument of Sir Roundell Palmer, Mr ..
Evarts admits that ordinary dealings in contraband in
the way of regular com1nerce is not prohibited. He adds,
however,
But whenever the neutral ports, places, and markets are really
used as the· bases of naval operations, when the circumstances
sLow that resort and that relation and that direct and efficient
contribution and that complicity and that origin and authorship,
which exhibit the belligerent himself, drawing military supplies
f~r the purpose of his naval operations from neutral ports, tha-t
is a use by a belligerent of neutral ports and waters as a base of
I lis na Yal operations, and is prohibited by the second Rule of the
Treaty. Undoubtedly the inculpation of a neutral for permitting
this use turns upon the question whether due diligence has been
u~ed to prevent it.
The argument upon the other side is that the meaning of " the·
base of operations", as it has been understood in authorities
relied upon by both nations, does not permit the resort to such
Heutral 1wrts and waters for the purpose of specific hostile acts,
but proceeds no further. The illustrative instances giYen by Lord.
Stowell or by Chancellor I\:ent in support of the ru!e are adduced
~ s being the measure of the rule.
These examples are of this
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IW ture:

A yessel cannot make an ambush for itself in neutral
\Yaters, cannot lie at the mouth of a neutral river to sally out to
sfize its prey, cannot lie \Vithin neutral waters and send its boats
to make captures outside their limits. All these things are prosctibed. But they are given as instances, not of flagrant, but of
incidental and lintitecl use. They are the cases that the comnwntators cite to show that even casual, temporary, and limited
experiments of this kind are not allowed, and that they are followed by all the definite consequences of an offence to neutrality
and of displeasure to a neutral, to wit, the resort by such neutral
power to the necessary tnethods to punish and redress these
violations of neutral territory. (Ibid., p. 460.)

i\1r. vVaite, replying to Sir Roundell Pahner's arguInent in regard to " base of operations ", said :
It is not contended by the Counsel of the United States, that
all supplies of coal in neutral ports to the ships of war of belligerents, are necessarily violations of neutrality, and, therefore,
unlawful. It will be sufficient for the purposes of this controversy,
if it shall be found that Great Britain pennitted or suf{e1·ed the
insurgents "to 1nake use of its ports or waters as the base of
na Yal operations against the United States", and that the supplies
of coal were obtained at such ports to facilitate belligerent operati()ns.
1. All naval warfare must, of necessity, have upon lanu a "base
of operations." To deprive a belligerent of that is equivalent
to depriving him of the power to carry on such a warfare successfully for any great length of time. 'Vithout it he cannot tnaintain
his ships upon the Ocean.
2. A "base of operations" for naval warfare is not alone, as
seems to be contended by the distinguished Counsel of Great
Britain, (sec. 3, chap. iii, of his argument,) " a place from which
operations of naval warfare are to be carried into effect." It
is not, of necessity, the place where the belligerent watches for,
and from which he moves against, the enemy; but it is any
place at which the necessary preparations for the warfare are
1nade; any place from, which ships, arms, ammunition, stores,
equipment, or men are furnished, and to which the ships of the
navy look for warlike supplies and for the 1neans of effecting the
necessary repairs. It is, in short, what its name implies-the
support, the foundation, which upholds and sustains the operations
·of a naval war. (Ibid., p. 513.)

Opinion of H all.-The opinion of Hall that "continued use is above all things the crucial test of a base "
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can hardly be supported. Indeed, Hall's own position
seems in some respects to be inconsistent 'vith this doctrine. A some,vhat extended quotation from I-Iall shows
this:
An argument placed before the Tribunal of Arbitration at
Geneva on behalf of the United States, though e1npty in the particular case to which it was applied, suggests that the essential'
ele1nents of the definition of a base possess a wider scope than
is usually given to then1. In 1865 The Shenandoa.lz, a Confederate·
cruiser, entered l\1elbourne in need of repairs, provisions, and
coal, and with a crew insufficient for {>Urposes of W"flr. She was-refitted and provisioned, and obtained a supply of coal, which.
seems to haYe enabled her to con1mit depredations in the neighbourhood of Cape Horn on whalers belonging to the United States,.
her crew having been surreptitiously recruited at the moment of
her departure from Port Philip. It was urged on the part ofthe government of that country that "the main operation of the·
naval warfare" of The Shenandoah having been accomplished!
by means of the coaling "and other refitment ", l\1elbourne had;
been converted into her base of operations. The argument was
unsound because continued use is above all things the crucial test
of a base, both as a matter of fact, and as fixing a neutral with
responsibility for acts in theinselves innocent or ambiguous. A
neutral has no right to infer evil intent from a single innocent
act perfonned by a belligerent armed force; but if he finds that
it is repeated several times, ancl that it has always prepared the
way for warlike operations, be may fairly be expected to assumethat a like consequence is intended in all cases to follow, and·
he ought therefore to prevent its being done within his territory ..
If a belligerent vessel, belonging to a nation having no colonies,
carries on hostilities in the Pacific by provisioning in a neutral
port, and by returning again and again to it, or to other similarports, without ever revisiting her own, the neutral country prac-tically becon1es the seat of magazines of stores, which though not
warlike are necessary to the prolongation of the hostilities wage<I
by the vessel. She obtains as solid an advantage as Russia in
a war with France would derive from being allowed to march her
troops across Germany. She is enabled to reach her ene1ny at a
spot which would otherwise be unattainable. [An illustration of
this is afforded by the voyage of the Russian Fleet, which quitted
Libau on October 15, 1904, and was annihilated at the battle of
the Tsu-shima, on l\Iay 26, 1905. During the \Vhole of this period
the squadrons both of .Admiral Hohjestvcntsky, which went round

HALL's OPINION

1'7

the Cape, and of the divisional commanders, who used the Suez
Canal, were entirely cut off from their base; they never touched
Russian territory from the llour they left the home waters, and
they were entirely dependent for their supplies of coal and of
fresh provisions upon what they could obtain on the way. A
series of floating coal depots, indeed, had been laid down in
adYance, but the operation of coaling seems to have taken place
more than once within territorial 'vaters, and it is obvious that
without a user of neutral ports, which is in conflict with the principles laid down aboYe, the expedition could only have accomplished a small portion of its journey. The prolonged stay of
the same fleet both at l\ladagascar and in French Cochin China
is difficult to reconcile with the obligations of neutrality. 1 ]
That preyiously to the A1nerican Civil 'Var neutral states were·
1wt affected by liability for acts done by a belligerent to a further
point thnn tlw t a bon~ indica ted, there can be no question; but
there is equally little question that opinion has moved onwards
since thn t time and the law can hardly be said to have remained
in its then state. Eveu du1·ing the A1nerican Civil War ship~
of war were ouly permitted to be furnished with so 1nuch coa 1
in English ports as might be sufficient to take thmn to the nearest
port of their own country, and were not allowed to r~ceive a
second sup11ly in the same or any other port, without special
pennission,. until after the expiration of three months from the ·
date of receiving such coal. The regulations of the United States
in 1870 were similn r ; no second supply being permitted for three ·
n1onths unless the Yessel requesting it had put into a European .
port in the inten·al. 2 'Vhen vessels were at the mercy of th~
winds it was not possible· to measure with accuracy the supplies
which 1night be furnished to the1n, and as blockades were seldom
continuously effective, and the nations which carried on distant
naval operations "·ere all provided .with colo.nies, questions _could
hardly spring from the use of foreign possessions as a source of
supplies. Under the altered conditions of warfare 1natters art'
1

See Smith and Sibley, International Law, 460-2. By the Declaration
of the Governor of Malta of August 1904, belligerent vessels proceeding
to the seat of war, or to any positions on the line of route with theobject of intercepting neutral vessels, were prohibited from making use of
British territorial waters for the purpose of coaling. Vessels in distress
were exempted. Similar instructions were sent to the Governors of the
Colonies (The Times, 23d August 1904; Smith and Sibley, op. cit., 135) .]
2
Earl Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, January 31,
1862. State Papers, 1871, Ixxi.
167. Among late writers, Ortolan:
(ii. 286), Bluntschii ( §773), and Heffter ( §149) simply register the
existing rule. Calvo ( §2674) expresses his approval of the English .
regulations.
[
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changed. 'Vhen supplies can be 1neted out in accordance with
the necessities of the case, to pern1it 1nore to be obtained than
can, in a reasonably liberal sense of the word, be called necessary
for reaching· a place of safety, is to provide the belligerent 'vitl1
means of aggressive action; and consequently to Yiolate the essen.tial principles of neutrality. (Hall, International Law, 8th ed.,
p. 724.)

Westlake's opinion, 1907.-vVriting in 1907 and taking
into consideration The Hague Conventions, vVestlake
says in regard to the Rules of the Treaty of "\Vashington,
" Some doubt has been felt whether ' base of operations '
in the second rule was not intended to refer to a base
used for large or repeated operations, the departure of a
single ship from a neutral port having been dealt ·w·ith
in the first rule. But the term ' base ' does not in itself
carry any implication as to the in1portance or number of
the operations proceeding from it, and the principle is
the same whether an expedition consists of a fleet or of
a single ship. Nay, more, the principle is the san1e for
expeditions starting from land or from sea frontiers.
'I'he departure of a force from either "\vith belligerent
intent is a 1natter which in every country is reserved for
the public authority, and any private person or foreign
government which presumes to dispatch a force with
such an intent usurps that authority, and involves the
territorial government which pern1its such a usurpation
in the charge of participating in the war. vVe are then
entitled to o1nit the "\vord ' naval ' fro1n the second
_Alabama. rule, and to expand 'ports and "\Vaters' into
'territory.' We have it thus as a general rule that 'a
neutral government is bound not to permit either belligerent to make use of its territory as the base of operations
against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or
aug1nentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitInent of men'." (International Law, part II; War, p.
192.)
Op·inion of lVestlake, 1910.-Son1e wTiters upon the
subject of 'vhat constitutes a base have endeaYored to
_introduce the idea of habitual or repeated nse as a neces-
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Professor Westlake 1n 1910 referred

L~interdiction de la transformation de ports neutres en bases
d'operations navales n'exclut pas seulement une serie de pareilles
operations. Une seule peut etre assez importante pour compromettre la neutralite d'un port qui en a ete la base. Ainsi un
Etat qui entend mnintenir une neutralite impartiale ne jouit que·
d"un champ tres restreint pour fixer a son gre la duree et les con-·
ditions du sejour des naYires belligerants. Encore ce champ peutil lui etre plutot nuisible. Il se peut qu'il veuille se reserver une
rertaine liberte de choix dans le matiere, moins pour pouvoir substituer une neutralite bienveillante a une neutralite impartiale,
que pour montrer aux deux parties de petites complaisances et
eviter des explications facheuses avec l'une et l'autre egalelnent.
1\lais, meme duns ce cas, l'Etat neutre ferait mieux d'aider a
l'etablissement de regles qu'il pourrait invoquer comme justifiant
sa conduite. Leur existence empecherait de se produire 1nainte
plainte au sujet de laquelle, une fois produite, les explications
ponrraient etre ·strictement suffisantes mais laisser fermenter une amertume dans les rapports subsequents des puissances en question. (23 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, p. 132.)

La1V!J'ence on base of operations.-The change of attitude upon the idea of " base of operations " is evident in·
the opinion of Dr. La,Yrence as set forth in the earlier
and later editions of his book Principles of International
Law·. Referring to Hall's statement that "continued
nse is above all things the crucial test of a base,'~ ·
La "Tence says :
nnd it is difficult to resist the arguments in favor of this view, .
which applies to a fteet or a single ship a·s well as to an army or
a detaclln1ent of troops. The drawing of supplies once or twice
from a given point in the course of long-continued hostilities will'
not n1ake it into a base. Constant communication n1ust be kept
up with it, from it a stream of supplies must flow, and the way ·
to it must be open for trains and convoys to pass and repass.
General Sherman, in his march through Georgia in the autumn
of 1864, \Yas said to have eut himself off from his base, because ·
for several "·eeks he was out of reach of communications from
his own side, nor could he draw stores and reinforcements from
any point in the po·ssession of the Northern forces. The fact that
he took provisions and forage from place after place passed by
his anny on its march did not make any of the1n into a base of ·
operations, because the element of continuous use was wanting ..
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Now if we apply those considerations to assist us in determining
the sense to be put upon the phrase when we find it in a rule of
International Law, we shall be forced to the conclusion that a
helligerent does not make neutral territory or a neutral port into
a. base of operations by obtaining in it once or t''ice, or at infrequent interYals, such things as provisions, coals and naval
stores. It is true that there are some articles so directly useful
for purposes of hostility that to take even a single supply of
them is forbidden. But these restraints are imposed by the law
of ua tions directly and in so 1nany words. They are not left to
be deriyed by construction from an interpretation of general
terms. Other 1natters must be referred to in the prohibition of
the use of neutral territory as a base of operations. Undoubtedly
it is aimed at the frequent drawing of stores and equipments fron1
depots situated in neutral territory and always open to the
belligerent for the replenishment of his Inagazines. Each separate
supply 1nay be innocent in itself, or at most of a doubtful nature.
It is their constant recurrence which 1nakes then1 illegal. ( 1895
~dition, p. 504.)

In the 1910 edition o:f the same 'vork La"'Tence says :
" but it is difficult to resist the argu1nent that, though continuous
use does undoubtedly make a place fro1n which supplies and reinforcements are drawn into a base, yet 've cannot go so far as to
·say that without continuous use there can be no question of any
violation of neutrality. It is quite possib~e, for instance, to con·ceive of a case where the admif:lsion into a neutral port of a warlike expedition for the purpose of refitlnent and coaling would en·able it to strike a successful blow at some neighboring possession
·of the other belligerent. Surely in such circu1nstances the port
would be a base of operations,. even though the belligerent flag was
··seen in it on no other occasion during the war. The phrase we are
considering is often used in connection with such 1natters as the
supply of arn1s and ammunition, the recruibnent of men, and the
.addition of equip1nents of war. But these things were prohibited
-definitely and directly long before the phrase was introduced, and
it cannot be regarded as prohibiting them all oyer again indefi·
nitely and indirectly. It is suggested that the words should be
used to coYer cases where acts which neutrals need not prohibit
'When done to a ~light extent or for a short thne, have taken
place on such scale or for so long a thne as to turn then1 into
occurrences highly beneficial to the belligerent in pursuit of his
·w arlike ends. For instance,. a brief visit to a neutral port is quite
.allowable, but a lengthy stay for purposes of rest and refitment
.should be forbidden; or a vrize 1nay be taken in and kept for
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n short period, but if the port is filled with prizes and they a1·e
left in safety there for an indefinite time, it should be regarded
as a base of operations." 1910 edition (p. 618).

General responsibilities.-The responsibility for acts
v; hich are legitimate only in the time of war rests upon
the belligerent who commits the act. The acts of war
n1ust be 'vithin the rules recognized as regulating the
conduct of hostilities. For acts not conforming to these
rules the one violating the rules assumes the responsibility. This principle is definitely announced in the first
article of the Hague Convention concerning the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War which
states that " Belligerents are bound to respect the
sovereign rights of neutral po,vers."
The responsibility for acts generally legitimate both
in tin1e of peace and in time of war is determined by the
act and the conditions under which it occurs. Entrance
of a belligerent vessel to a neutral port with the purpose
of departing within the time fixed by the neutral state
·would be legiti1nate so far as the belligerent and neutral
states are concerned and a sojourn for a longer period
on account of stress of weather might be equally legitimate. Sojourn by a belligerent vessel for a period
longer than that allo,ved and without such reason, if unlmo\vn to the neutral, would be a violation of neutrality
:and the responsibility .would rest upon the belligerent.
Such sojourn with the knowledge and consent of the
:neutral would transfer the responsibility to the neutral
.state.
For the commission of acts legitimate in the tin1e of
_peace but not legitimate within neutral jurisdiction in
time of war the neutral state is responsible so far as the
HLanifest neglect of the neutral state to exercise " due
.diligence " makes the acts possible.
Privileges and obligat1~ons of belligerents.-The gen~ral practice of permitting ships of war of belligerents
to enter neutral maritime jurisdiction gives to the vessels certain privileges. The permission to enter would
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be an e1npty one if the vessel should be necessarily in
a less favorable condition on departure than before entrance, i.e~, if a vessel enters and is allo·wed to purchase
no supplies 'vhatever the stock would be depleted by
the a1nount consumed during the sojourn. 'fhe privilege of entrance 'vould seem reasonably to carry with
it the privilege of maintaining the vessel in a state of
general efficiency at least equal to that existing at the
time of entrance. On the grounds of humanity and in
accordance 'vith precedents, still further privileges have
ordinarily been afforded. These have varied at different times and in different states. The privileges
granted must not be such as to involve participation in
the hostilities for this 'vould violate the accepted principles of la,vful neutral conduct.
The belligerent is under obligation in turn to respect
the neutral jurisdiction. As the neutral state admit::;
the belligerent vessel as a privilege, the belligerent
should avoid acts 'vhich 'vould partake of the nature
of hostilities or be in disregard of the regulations of
the neutral.
Duty of belligerents.-The Hague Convention XIII,
concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Po,vers
in ~1ariti1ne "'\V ar places the primary obligation upon
the belligerent. In article I is the following statement:
Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral
Powers ancl to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters,
frmn all acts which would constitute, on the part of the neutral
Powers whi<:h knowingly permitted them, a non-fulfillnent of their
neutrality.

This position sustains the contention that the burden
of 'var should so far as possible be borne by the belligerent. 'fhe need for regulations had been seen in the
diversity of practice in recent 'vars. The form of article
I follo''Ts closely the draft of the proposition originally
submitted by Great Britain.
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Adndssion of private vessels.-'The ad1nission of private vessels is generally without restriction, save necessary port regulations. The admission of a private vessel
is usually assu1necl to be of advantage to the state receiving the vessel and to the vessel. The right of entrance
subject to necessary port regulations 1nay be said to be
admitted in the family of nations. The private vessel
would be subject to such restrictions as may be established; other,vise the vessels would be unrestrained.
These restrictions might be somewhat more numerous in
time of war than in time of peace, but, in general, to
private vessels acts not prohibited may be regarded as
allo,ved.
IJ~x;clusion of- vessels of war.-The admission of a belligerent vessel of war to a neutral port or waters is, in
general, not for the benefit of the neutral state. It is now
usual for a neutral state to prescribe the conditions of
admission and of sojourn. In some instances belligerent
ships of war are excluded as in the case of the Netherlands proclamation of July 30, 1914:
ARTICLE 2. As long as the Order mentioned in Article I (Royal
Order of October 30, 1909) is not in force, it is forbidden to war
ships or similar vessels of foreign powers to enter the Netherlands
territorial 'vaters from the sea or to remain therein.

Other states have made regulations varying in character. Nearly all states assume the right to exclude foreign
vessels of 'var fro1n certain maritime areas and to regulate the action of foreign vessels of war in all areas.
The acts 'vhich may be allo,ved to a belligerent vessel
of 'var within neutral jurisdiction are usually enumerated
and acts not per1nitted are generally regarded as prohibited.
'
As the basis of regulation of the ad1nission and conduct of private vessels and vessels of war differs, the
regulations would naturally differ. The regulations for
the admission of vessels of war are now regarded as
proceeding fron1 a generally accepted right of absolute
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prohibition. To endeavor to make the regulations for·
both classes of vessels the sa1ne would lead to unnecessaryconfusion.
Enu1neration of acts which should be prohibited to belligerent vessels ":ould be manifestly impossible as these.
y~~ill vary.
The general principle is that action friendly and not
involving participation in war will be allowed and that
the burden of the war should not be unnecBssarily thrown
upon the neutral. A neutral state is not obliged by theexistence of 'var bet,veen two states with which it is on
tern1s of friendship to break off relations with thosestates but 1nerely to refrain from participation in the~
contest by aiding one against the other. As regards.
n1aritin1e relations aid 'vould be afforded if the neutral
acted in such manner as to increase the fighting efficiency
of either belligerent or if it allowed either belligerent
to use the protection of the neutral jurisdiction to this.
encl. A neutral state is under no obligation to endeavorto prevent acts within its jurisdiction which if having·
any relation at all to hostilities is only re1note, e.g., innocent passage through its waters. On the other hand:.
the obligation is clear 'vhere relation to the hostilities is
proximate, e.g., fitting out and arming a vessel. Action
other than permitted within neutral jurisdiction would.
constitute a violation or neglect to fulfill the obligations.
of neutrality. If committed by the belligerent without
the knowledge of or in a manner beyond the control of
the neutral, the responsibility would rest primarily upon
the belligerent. If committed with the knowledge of·
and within the power of control of the neutral, there
"rould be a nonfulfillment of neutral obligations and the·
responsibility 'vould rest on the neutral state.
Ideas of neu.tral base.-Article 5 of the Hague Con-vention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Po,vers in l\1aritime "\Var forbids belligerents the use of·
neutral ports or 'vaters as a base of n.aval operations.,

NEUTRAL BASE

2~.

against their ad ,~ ersaries. This same article specifies one
particular use, viz, the erection of radio stations or any
npparatns for the purpose of communication vvith belligerent forces on land or sea. Article 8 places the neutral
govern1nent under obligation to prevent the fitting out or ·
ar1ning of any vessel designed to carry on '\Yar against a
state '\Yith ''hich the neutral state is at peace. Article ·
12 provides against long sojourn of belligerent ships in
I~eutral ports. Article 17 li1nits repairs to belligerent
ships of 'var to those necessary to render the ships sea'vorthy. Article 19 forbids the use of neutral waters for ·
replenishing or increasing vvar material, armament or
cre,Ys. Li1nitations upon supplies of food and fuel are ·
i1nposed in article 19, and article 20 provides a.s to the
:frequency of taking such supplies. Article 25 provides
for the enforcen1ent of these rights of a neutral state by
.; the 1nea.ns at its disposal." · Such acts as those above
Inentioned have been named by some as constituting
neutral w·aters as a base.
'fhe opinion has been frequently expres~ed that ?"epcated use is necessary to constitute a place within
neutral jurisdiction a base of operations.
This opinion is expressed by certain of the vvriters on
international la'v particularly during the last quarter of
the nineteenth century. It also appears in some state
regulations.
Base in neutral jurisdiction, definition.-Often the idea
has been expressed that it is necessary that the' use of a
neutral port or 'vaters be repeated use in order to constitute a base. It is evident that frequent or repeated use
'vould be one of the clearest evidences of the use of a
port as a base. A single use of a port Inight, ho,vever,
constitute the port a base provided this use 'vere in
e.xcess of or in contravention of permitted use. It is ·
no'v generally admitted that a belligerent is bound not
to use neutral w·aters except as permitted and that the
neutral state is bound to use the n1eans at its disposal .
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-to prevent such unpermitted use. These general rules
indicate the principle "\vhich underlies the idea of base,
viz, use beyond that per1nitted to the belligerent and giving rise to an obligation on the part of the neutral state
to use the force at his disposal to prevent. It is not for
the belligerent to judge 'vhat should be permitted; it is
the duty of the belligerent to refrain fron1 acts which
are not pern1itted by the la,vs and procla1nations of neutrality. It may be said that in time of "\Var the use of
neutral ports or waters other than permitted by la "\YS and
procla1nations constitutes such ports or \Vaters a base.
A base within neutral jurisdiction is therefore a place
which is used by a belligerent in a 1nanner not per1nitted
by la"\v.
Franco-Prussian War, 1870.-There \vas much uncertainty in 1870 in regard to the proper regulation of neutral conduct. The arbitral a"\vard in the Alaban~a case
later thre"\v some light upon certain points in regard to
neutral obligation. 'I:'he procla1nation issued by President Grant in October 1870 was quite con1prehensive and
has been the basis of subsequent proclamations. (For
full text see International Law Situations, 1904, p. 68.)
The reasons why this proclamation was so definite in
regard to the use o:f American ports and waters 1nay in
part be seen fro1n the letter of the British Minister of
October 10, 1870.
\VASHI~GTO~,

Oct. 10, 1870.

l\IY Lonn: I haYe the honour to inclose a copy of a Proclatna-

tion which "·as signed by the President of the United States on
the 8th instant, and published yesterday, as to the tnanner in
which, 'vith reference to the ·war now existing between France
and the North German Confederation and its allies, the armed
vessels of either belligerent, whether public ships or privateers,
are to be treated in the ports of the United States. The contents
of this Proclamation are in many respects similar to the orders
recently given by I-Ier :Majesty's GoYernment with respect to the
treatn1ent of such vessels in British ports.
It would seem that the issue of this document has been instigated by the recent conduct of :F'rench Yessels of war in the neigh-
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bourhood of the port of New York. It is said that French gunboats have lately moored about the entrance of that port, and
have sometimes been anchored outside, within three miles of the
coast, for_ the purpose of intercepting any North German vessels
which might leave New York, and particularly the German stean1(lrs, which, in consequence of the termination of the blockade o·f
the German ports, have renewed their voyages. On one occasion
the French gunboat "Latouche Treville" steamed up the Bay of
New York, round the steamer "Hermann", went out again, and
unchored outside.
A French frigate and two smaller vessels of vvar arrived lately
at New London in Connecticut, on the pretext of requiring repairs;
they remained there for some days, although they only had to
repair some spars, which could have been done nearly as well at
sea as on shore. From that point notice could be given of the
sailing of German Yessels from New York, and men-of-war stationed at New London could easily have intercepted them.
l\1r. Fish told me that he had represented to the French l\iinister
that, although he could not positively allege a violation of international law, he considered that the proceedings of belligerent
vessels of war in hovering about the entrance of a neutral port,
and, as it were, blockading it, and rnaking the neighbourhood a
station for their observations, were contrary to custom, and
were unfriendly and uncourteous to the United States. l\1r. Fish
added that M. Berthemy had written upon the subject to the
French Admiral, who, in reply, had denied the fact of hovering
about the port, or of using the neighbourhood as a station of
observation; but confessed that the proceeding of the "Latouche
Treville " in entering the port of New York for the purpo·se of
observing the steamer " Hermann " was improper, and that her
commander had consequently been severely reproved.
My Prussian colleague, in expressing his satisfaction at the issue
of the inclosed Proclamation, has made observations which leaq.
me to suppose that he imagines that by its provisions merchantships are prohibited from exporting arms and ammunition from
the ports of the United States for the use of the belligerents, and
I fear that he may have telegraphed in that sense to his Government; but though I did not feel called upon to question Baron
Gerolt's view of the case, I can find no expressions in the Proclamation to justify such an interpretation; indeed, Mr. Fish denies
that it was intended to convey any such me-aning.
I have, etc.
ED\V. THORNTON.

{Das Staatsarchiv. vol. 20, p. 351.)
3628-34--3
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Secretary Fish, In a letter to Minister Washburne at
Paris, said :
DEP.ARTMENT OF STATE,

Wa,shington, October

4, 1810.

This Government desires and intends to maintain a perfect and
strict neutrality between the two powers now unfortunately engaged in war. It desires also to extend to both the manifestation
of its friendly feeling in every possible way, and will allow to
the vessels of war of each power, equally, the hospitality of its
ports and harbors for all proper and friendly purposes.
But this hospitality is liable to abuse, and circumstances ha\e
arisen to give rise in the minds of some persons to the apprehension that attempts at such abuse have taken place.
I am not in possession of facts to justify me in saying that
such has been the case, but I have deemed myself justified in
calling the attention of M. Berthemy, the French representative
at this capital,. to the current rumors, sustained as they are by
the presence of a nu1nber of French vessels upon the coast of the
United States. These vessels have appeared at or near the entrance of the harbor of New York, off Sandy Hook; at the
entrance of the Long Island Sound; at or near the entrance of
the Chesapeake Bay. One or more is represented to have been
anchored not far from Sandy Hook (the main entrance to New
York Harbor,) and there is a difference of statement as to the
precise distance at whith she lay from the shore; some claiming
that she was within a marine league. But of this there is no
positive evidence. She has entered the port of New York (as
claimed by some) for the purpose of watching a German steamer
about to sail thence. Three of them have put into th~ harbor of
New London (\vhich looks out upon Long Island Sound, the
eastern entrance to the New York Harbor) avowedly for some
small repairs ; one recently asked permission, which was gi·anted,
to make some repairs at the Norfolk navy yard, near the entranee
of Chesapeake Bay.
All this may be consistent with an intention of perfect observance of the neutral character of our waters and jurisdiction, and
with an entire absence of undertaking any hostile moYement
against the vessels of North Germany, from those waters, or that
jurisdiction.
A large trade has been carried on from the ports of the United
States, approached by the waters in which these vessels have thus
appeared, by vessels belonging to North Germany.
The appearance of French vessels in these immediate neighborhoods, in such nutnbers and force, does not fail to excite the
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alarm of these vessels, and must have the effect to a greater or
less degree to diminish that trade.
The United States are not prepared at present to say that any
actual violation of international law has been committed, or that
the hospitality of these waters has been positively abused. But
the hovering of the vessels of war of a belligerent on the coasts
near the entrance of the principal ports of a friendly power does
interfere with the trade of the friendly power.
The interruption of the regular communication with you, by
reason of the investment of Paris, has led me to represent to
IYI. Berthemy our views on this subject, and to say that, although
the vessels of either belligerents may not actually shelter within
the jurisdiction of the United States and proceed thence against
the vessels of its enemy, this Government would regard as an
unfriendly act the hovering of such vessels upon the coast of the
United States, near to its shores, in the neighborhood of its ports,
nnd in the track of the ordinary commerce of these ports, with
intent to intercept the vessels of tra<le of its ene1ny.
I have requested l\1. Berthemy to n1ake known these views to
the French government, and to express the confident hope of the
President that there may be no cause of complaint on the part of
this Government by reason of any such hovering by the vessels
of the French government.
You will be pleased to take an early opportunity to present the
~arne view to the minister for foreign affairs, which you may do
by reading to hin1 this dispatch.
HAMIL'I'ON FISH.
(1870, Foreign Relations. U. S., p. 70.)

Japanese neutrality, 1870.-The fact that there were
special privileges accorded to certain European powers in
the maintenance of ships of war in Japanese waters for
protection of Europeans in the years before 1870 gave
rise to complications on the outbreak of war. Japan
issued a proclamation of neutrality, as follows :
PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY.

Information having been received that war has broken out between Prussia and France, his l\Iajesty the Emperor has declared·
his resolve to maintain strict neutrality, and he has therefore·
directed that the following regulations shall be made known, not
only at the open ports, but also at all towns on the sea:-coast,..
so as-to prevent untoward consequences.

30

BELLIGERENTS IN NEUTRAL WATERS

ARTICLE I. The contending parties are not permitted to engage
in hostilities in Japanese harbors or inland waters, or within a
distance of three ri from land at any place, such be~ng the dis·
tance to which a cannon ball can be thrown. Men-of-war or Iner·
chant vessels will, however, be allowed free passage as heretofore.
ARTICLE II. Any vessel belonging to either of the contending parties, whether men-of-war or merchant vessels, shall be impartially
supplied with wood, 'vater, and provisions at the open ports, or
other sea-ports of Japan in the same way as notified before, and
shall receive assistance in case of distress.
ARTICLE III. If ships of war belonging to both parties shall
enter the same port, the ship belonging to one party will not be
allowed to sail until twenty-four hours after the departure of
the other.
ARTICLE IV. Some countries have troops stationed at one of the
open ports, their men-of-war are allowed to anchor there, and a
Illll rine camp has been formed; but this permission has been
granted solely for the ordinary protection of their subjects resident at the port in question, and not for any purpose connected
with foreign wars. These quarters must not be used in furtherance of any expedition against the enemy, and unconnected with
their ordinary use.
ARTICLE V. Japanese vessels are prohibited from carrying troops,
ar1n~, or munitions of war for the service of either of the hostile
parties.
ARTICLE VI. All persons, with the exception of pilots, who shall
take service on board of ships of war of either of the contending
pa1-ties, will do so at their own risk and peril.
ARTICLE VII. The sale of prizes in a Japanese harbor is prvhihitetl. In case, however, it should become necessary to dispose
of a prize in a Japanese harbor, per1nission should be applied for,
an(l question decided in consultation with the diplomatic repreSPnUtth·e of the nation to which the captor belongs.
AP.TICLE VIII. \Vith regard to other articles of import and export the same rules are to be observed as hitherto.
ARTICLE IX. In case any of the provisions of the above regula-tions whkh relate to foreigners should be infringed, steps should
he takrn to put a stop to such acts by application to the consul of
the party concerned, if committed at the open ports. If representations to the consul are of no effect, application should be made
t o the Japnnese men-of-war stationed there to take the necessary
~teps.
If a breach of these regulations be committed at a nontrPn ty port, the local authorities should inform the authorities at
th :• m·arPst open port, and also the Japanese Inen-of-war. In the
ca~e of remote places, notice should be sent direct to the war and
fo.rei,gn offices.
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'l'he above regulations must be carefully attended to by the
authorities of the open ports, and of the seaboard Fu, Han, and
Ken.
DAJOKWAN.

1870.
(1870, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 188.)

AUGUST,

P1"actice of intervention.-During the period before
1830 there had been in general a favorable attitude toward intervention in affairs of \veak states, and the 1nore
po"·erful states had found no difficulty in persuading
themselves of the necessity for "interfering," "inter·
Incddling," or intervening in the affairs of weaker states.
During the last 100 years there has been a gro,ving
opinion favorable to noQintervention, though Gericke
(De j'ure interventionis), in 1834, looking back upon the
period of 45 years since the French Revolution found
ample exa1nples supporting the view that intervention
was the nor1nal conduct in international relations.
There have been many interventions since 1834 in
Inany parts of the world. _ The United States has frequently intervened for varying reasons, and in a single
year in countries in the Mediterranean, South America,
and the Pacific Ocean. Revolutions in less advanced
states have been numerous and have made it necessary
that the n1ore po\verful states protect their o\vn citizens
at least. The grounds of intervention have ranged from
self-protection to so-called "treaty obligations."
Early doctrines of intervention are being revived by
modern propositions in regard to the maintenance of
world peace. States outside a dispute are presuming to
deter1nine in advance and without invitation how the
issue of the dispute shall be regarded. In some of these
instances reversion to the attitude of 200 years ago seems
to be prevalent.
Though the topic of intervention has been much discussed there are still wide differences of opinion as to
whether a right of intervention can be maintained. The
reason for some of the differences of opinion is the difference in defining intervention. Early definitions usually
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regarded intervention as interference in the internal affairs of one state by another state, or the interference
by a third state in the relations of two other states 'vithout the consent of either. Some later 'vriters have employed the 'vord to define interference 'vhich is primarily
to secure observance of international obligations, thus
transferring the ground :from internal to external affairs.
This would involve opposing or preventing action by a
state which would imperil the rights of another state as
a sovereign political unity. Others deny that such action on the part of a state as is essential to the maintenance of its independence or of the independence of
another state in the community of nations is in any
sense intervention, but affirm that this action is merely
self-defense or maintenance of the obligations due to
members of the community of nations among themselves.
Such action is sometimes collective or, if not, is constructively in the nature of unselfish effort in behalf of the
community. The growing interdependence of states as
of individuals 'vi thin states requires a greater degree
of cooperation a1nong states, and many modifications of
the range of activities within which entire freedom may
be exercised. These changes would not be extensions o.f
the field of intervention but rather extension of the field
within which each state may lawfully act and defend its
right to act. The distinction between intervention and
n1aintenance of rights is not always easy to make in practice. As the word intervention is used in time of peace,
it seems, to indicate (1) interference by one state in the
internal affairs of another, (2) interference by a state
in the relations bet,veen t'vo other states, and (3) measures taken by a state to maintain international rights
<>r 'vhat it may claim to be international rights.
Belligerent vessels and neutral port8.-The entrance
.o f armed :forces of one state upon the land of another
state has long been prohibited both in time of peace and
in time of 'var. The entrance of naval :forces of one
state into the "~aters of another state in time of peace is
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usually subjected to fe'v restrictions and in time of war
is ordinarily permitted under stated restrictions. It has
been generally maintained that the belligerent should not
thro'v upon a neutral, which desires to have no part in
the 'var, burdens for the conduct of the war. This is
evident in the first article of XIII Hague Convention,
1907, concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval \Var 'vhich states that "Belligerents are
bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers,"
and to refrain from all acts 'vhich if knowingly permitted by the neutral 'vould constitute a nonfulfillment
of its neutrality. The duty rests upon the belligerent
and it is the right of the neutral to demand that the
belligerent observe the obligations to which it is bound.
This principle is international law as well as also explicitly set forth in the Convention.
The preamble of this Convention affirms that it isfor neui:ral Powers, an admitted duty to apply these rules impartially to the several belligerents.

Article 2 provides,
Any act of hostility,· including capture and the exercise of the
right of search, committed by belligerent war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a violation of
neutrality and is strictly forbidden.

Article 25 reciprocally places certain obligations upon
the neutral, the performance of which under article 26
w·ould not be considered unfriendly:
ARTICLE 25. A neutral Power is bound to exercise such surveillance as the means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation
of the provisions of the above Articles occurring in its ports or
roadsteads or in its waters.
ARTICLE 26. The exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid
down in the present Convention can under no circumstances be
considered as an unfriendly act by one or other belligerent who
bas accepted the Article relating thereto. (36 U.S.Stat., p. 2415.)

This XIII Hague Convention is one of rights and duties
and an impartial application of the rules is implied.
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One of the preliminary questions is "\Vhether belligerent
ships of war should be allowed to enter neutral "\Vaters.
This gives rise to the question as to what constitutes
neutral "\Vaters. In a general "\vay it may be said that
the expression "neutral waters" is a term which covers
all the maritime area over which the neutral state is
entitled to exercise jurisdiction. This area would include
the marginal sea as well as ports, roadsteads, and inland
waters.
It is evident that the responsibility o:f a neutral state
would differ in degree according to the area. It could
be :fairly affirmed that the responsibility within a port
could be regarded as more compl~te than one on a remote
coast or near the outer line o:f the marginal sea, a point
which n1ight not always be easy to determine.
Article 32 o:f the original British proposition at The
Hague, 1907, aimed to recognize the difference o:f obligation by stating that the articles o:f the proposed rules
should not be interpreted in such manner as to prohibit
the simple passage o:f the ships o:f war or o:f auxiliary
ships o:f a belligerent through neutral waters. In the discussion o:f this proposition the Turkish delegate said
that his government could not sign an engagement which
would limit its control o:f the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.
There had previously been a proposition that straits connecting open seas should never be closed.
The Danish delegate explained his idea in regard to
straits, saying:
The amendment which the Danish delegation has taken the
liberty of proposing to Article 32 of the British project limits
the simple right of passage of war-ships and auxiliary vessels of
a belligerent to the territorial waters uniting two open seas.
The Danish delegation, in presenting this amendment, was inspired mainly by the following reasons :
Recognition of an unlimited simple right of passage for belligerent war-ships can hardly be reconciled "·itll tha neutral's right
to close interior waters for the purpose of defending his neutrality-notably bodies of water with two entrances-which offer
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a belligerent fleet special opportunties as a base of operations,
as well as for certain acts that are unlawful in neutral waters.
In granting belligerents the simple right of passage through
territorial waters, and at the same time allowing neutrals to
preYent admission to these waters, we would be taking away with
one band what we had given with the other.
As the laying of submarine mines by neutrals comes within
the jurisdiction of another Commission, I cannot enter into the
details of that question.
I only want to bring out the connection between the two questions and the uesira bility of not restricting by convention the
exercise of a neutral's sovereign rights over his territorial waters
in such a way as to deprive him of the most effectual means he
has of enforcing the important prescriptions of this same con-.
vention. (Proceedings of The I-I ague Peace Conferences, Carnegie
Endow1nent for International Peace, 'Tol. III, p. 599.)

The regulation finally. took a purely negative form as
article 10.
The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere passage
through its territorial waters of ships of war or of prizes belonging
to belligerents.

Such a regulation Inay still leave the neutral state free
to determine what action would involve more than simple
passage through neutral waters.
·
It is generally admitted that there will be mariti1ne
areas 'vithin 'vhich belligerent ships of war will not be
allo,ved to pass. Such areas have been specified fro In
time to time in neutrality proclamations or otherwise.
There seems therefore to be a general tendency to admit
in practice the principle that while the waters of a
neutral state are usually open to belligerent ships of war
certain areas may be closed by general proclamation or
by notification at the place.
.
Russo-Japanese War, 1905.-During the Russo-Japa~
nese War, 1904-05, there were many examples of acts
by belligerents 'vhich under ordinary conditions would
be regarded as in violation of neutrality. Belligerent
acts in l(orea and in l\1anchuria were in an area technieally neutral.
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Admiral Togo, o£ the Japanese Navy, reported as £olJo\vs in regard to the Russian destroyer Ryeshitelni in
the neutral port o£ Chefoo :
According to the report fr01n Commander Fujimoto, Commander
of the First Torpedo-destroyer Flotilla, regarding the capture of
the Russian destroyer Ryeshitelni at Chefoo, the Japanese destroyers Asashiwo and J(asunti, under the command of Commander Fujimoto,. were searching for the ene1ny's warships on
the night of the lOth inst. when one of the latter was sighted
steaming westward. Our destroyers at once pursued the enemy,
but the latter disappeared from view in the darkness of the
night. A further search the following day (the 11th inst.) revealed the fact that the enemy's vessel had taken refuge in
Chefoo harbour. Our destroyers accordingly remained outside the
neutral zone, and waited for the Russian warship; but the enemy
did not come out from the harbour.
On entering the port on the night of the 11th inst., our destroyers ascertained that the enemy's warship was the destroyer
Ryeshitelni. It \Vas also found that she had not been disarmed,
but had taken in coal, all the officers and men remaining on
board. At 3 p.m. on the 12th inst., Lieutenant Terajima of the
Asashiwo, accompanied by ten petty officers and men, was despatched on board the enemy's destroyer, for the purpose of in- .
forming the captain of the Russian destroyer that our vessels
had traced and 'vatched him, and that, as he had entered the
harbour at 4 a.m. the previous day and had not yet left it, he
was offered an alternative either to issue from the harbour in one
hour or surrender, the refusal of which would result in out•
disposal of the Russian destroyer at our will. The enemy, however, not only refused our demand, under various pretexts, but
inflicted outrages by force on our officers and men. All of the
Russians then jumped into the sea, meanwhile blowing up the
fore part of the ship, whereupon we at once captured the destroyer and left the harbour at 5.15 p.m. with the vessel in tow.
A Russian on board was taken prisoner. ( S. Takahashi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War,. p. 437.)

According to the opinion o£ Professor Takahashi, who
had been legal adviser to the Japanese fleet in the ChinoJapanese \Var and later a member o£ the legal committee
o£ the Department o£ Foreign Affairs, the action in the
case o£ the Ryeshitelni was justified. He says:
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In the presence of this clear and distinct invasion of the neutrality of China by Russia and the failure of China to take any
steps to prevent an infringement of her neutrality, the Japanese
Government were fully justified in adopting such measures of
self-protection as n1ight seem necessary to them. They could not
~ay that the unlawful acts of Russia and the supineness of China,
working together, should be permitted to operate to the prejudice
of their rights and interests. It is not alone in the n1atter of the
Rueshitelni that there has been a violation of the neutrality of
Chefoo. In installing a system of wireless telegraphy between
Port Arthur and the Russian Consulate at Chefoo there was a
no less flagrant disregard of China's neutrality, and notwith~tanding the repeated protests of the Japanese Government, China
permitted the systen1 to continue in operation. The Japanese
Government had every wish and intention to continue to respect
the neutrality of China outside those regions occupied by Russia
so long as Russia did the same. But it is hardly to be expected
that they would allow their enemy to escape the consequence of
the 'var by disregarding China's neutrality. (Ibid., p. 441.)

General discussion at The Hague, 1907.-At the Hague
Conference in 1907 the question o£ elaborating a convention relating to the conduct of ships o£ war in neutral
ports was recognized as complex and difficult, but none
the less essential. As the President of the committee,
Count Tornielli, said :
It is indeed a useful thing to make certain common rules more
precise, but only on condition that in seeking an agreement upon
this subject the fact is not lost sight of that the legislative indevendence of the several countries 1nust not be unduly hampered.
The logical deductions from the immutable principle of national
sovereignty see1n considerably to simplify our task. If they
prevail, our only reply to the question that has been put to us
could be included in four precepts, upon which it should not be
difficult to reach an agreement.
These precepts rnay be formulated thus:
(1) l\Iutual recognition by the contracting Powers of their
legislative independence in the matter of respect for neutrality.
(2) Impartial application to all belligerent parties of the laws
which the several States have enacted.
(3) Mutual renunciation by neutrals of the right to introduce
r.hanges in their national laws in this respect while a state of war
exists between two or more contracting Powers.
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( 4) Absolute duty of belligerents to respect the laws of
neutrals.
I should like to see the 'vork which we are about to undertake
follow these lines. If we are able to advance a little in this
direction, our tin1e w.ill not have been wasted and what we accomplish will be in the interest of progress. (Proceedings of the
Hague Peace Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, vol. III, p. 573.)

The British delegate in presenting the somewhat elab-·
orate set o:f rules in behalf o:f his Govern1nent, said:
l\Iy government has deemed it its duty to propose to the Confer~
ence the draft regulations which have been filed in its name, be,
cause it considers that it is of the utmost importance to define
precisely the treat1nent which a neutral State may apply to belligerent vessels in its ports and territorial waters. '\Ve owe it to
neutrals to indicate to what extent they will be permitted, in
thne of war, to give shelter to and to provision vessels of one
Df the belligerents without exposing themselves thereby to justifiable con1plaint on the part of the other belligerent. Likewise it
is no more than just to state the treatment which belligerents
will have the right to expect fro1n neutrals. Uncertainty in this
respect can only give rise to misunderstandings and disputes.
Now, it is indisputable that uncertainty prevails with regard to
this 1natter. \Ve need only consult the texts to convince ourselves
of this. Thus, to cite an instance, it is stated in a nun1ber of
works on international law that the so-called 24-hour rule is
universally recognized, while we know that several States do not
recognize this rule, and do not consider themselves bound to
observe it. (Ibid., p. 575.)

The Netherlands delegate pointed out the existing
difficulties confronting a state having re1note dependen.
.
c1es, saying:
The delegation of the Netherlands wishes to observe that the
question which is on the day's order of business is of the utmost
importance to its Government, which in recent wars has observed
the most ilnpartial neutrality, but which, because of the colonies
that it })Ossesses in different quarters of the world and of the
numerous ports therein, has nevertheless been placed at times in
a very embarrassing situation.
The Government of the Netherlands therefore greatly desires
t hat a 1l questions which may arise as a result of the stay of
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belligerent warships in neutral ports and waters may henceforth
be obviated by a common agreement, establishing a system san~
tioned by the rules of conventional law.
\Vithout taking a stand on all the questions that may come up·
in the course of our debates, I shall confine myself for the time
being to a general observation. It \Vould seem to me, first of all,
whateYer definitive system may be agreed upon, that the rules
defining this system should be precise and clear and should not
leave a loophole for any future ambiguity.
'The neutral n1ust know \vhat he is expected to do. His freedom
of action lllllst not be restricted without legitimate cause. Belligerents 1nust be guaranteed perfect equality of treatment. These
are two cardinal rules which must serve as the basis of a just
and equitable system. (Ibid., p. 578.)

The Japanese delegate pointed out certain difficulties
under the present conditions :
There are not at present clear and universally recognized rules
g<:'Yerning the relations between neutrals and belligerents with regard to the questions that have been laid before us, and history
teaches us thnt the diYergent and frequently conJicting interpreta tions and 11ractices adopted in the past by different countries
haYe been one of the most fruitful causes of international irritation and recrimination. It would therefore be desirable to
remove as far as possible the dangers arising from this state of
affairs.
The peaceful acts of neutrals should be respected to the greatest
possible extent and as far as is compatible with the recognized
rights of belligerents and should be allowed to proceed without
being disturbed by war; but in order to insure the result desired,
neutrals should see to it, on their side, that their territories and
territorial waters are not utilized by belligerents as bases for
the carrying on of military enterprises, so as to furnish cause for
complaint.
To further the cause of peace by warding off war, to prevent
abuse of the hospitality of neutrals by drawing a clear distinction
between permissible peaceful acts and prohibited n1ilitary operations on the part of belligerents in neutral ports and waters,
to discourage as much as possible the use of these neutral ports
and waters for Inilitary purposes by means of restrictions acting
in a way as automatic prohibitions, without affecting in any way
w~atsoever the right and privilege of using these ports and·
waters as places of refuge and for purely humanitarian purposes;
to vrotect neutrals in the enjoyn1ent of their rights and. in the-
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fulfillment of their duties by specifically defining these rights
and duties-such is the purpose of the Japanese proposal. (Ibid.,
p. 579.)

Perhaps M. Louis Renault, the reporter of the subcommittee having in charge the question of belligerent vessels
in neutral waters, would be considered as speaking with
the most general know ledge. He gave careful consideration to all the proposals and said after the preparation
of the questionnaire and in his capacity as · a French
delegate rather than as reporter.
The exercise of the neutral's right of sovereignty, whose source
is the common law, must naturally be reconciled with observance
by the neutral of the duty incumbent upon him not to take part
in hostilities. Now, as a rna tter of fact, the positive law of
nations, as it stands at present, allows neutral States great latitude in regula~ing the status of belligerent war-ships in neutral
ports and waters. This latitude has resulted in giving rise to
divergences in the la,vs of the various countries on the subject,
which divergences show themselves in the declarations of neutrality promulgated by neutrals on the outbreak of war. And
that is not all. There have been cases where the same country
has not observed the same rules of neutrality in different wars;
at times it has even happened that it has changed its rules during
different phases of the same war. This shows the Yery great
uncertainty there is on this subject, a very annoying uncertainty,
causing misunderstandings, recriminations, and at times calculated
t0 lead to disputes.
Again, it may happen that this or that rule may, under various
circumstances, favor one of the belligerents, although it was not
made in his behalf. Geographical or military circumstances may
·create a situation that is to his advantage, without there being
any intention on the part of the neutral to favor him. The other
belligerent naturally finds this consequence an annoyance and
may even be led to lodge a complaint on that score.
From this point of view it would be very beneficial to settle
upon uniform regulations which, as they would not emanate from
any one State, would be observed the more willingly. This general regulation, which is so desirable, would have the effect of
eliminating causes of complaint which might easily degenerate
:into disputes.
Such is the ideal, if we can hope to succeed in reaching an
;ngreement upon all the points and in concluding a general Con-
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vention. But if it were merely possible to reach an agreement
upon a few rules, we would thereby have reduced the uncertainty
and narrowed the field of possible disputes. It is proper to note,
in this connection, that as regards the points upon which it has
been impossible to reach an agreement, the fundamental principle would remain intact and the legislative bodies of the several
States, as our President has poiilted out, would retain all their
rights. (Ibid., p. 581.)

1,he demand :for some regulations which should be so
:far as possible uniform was quite general. The inclination o:f the Conference was in the main :favorable to clear
statements in the rules. Naturally it was not possible
to reach agreement upon all topics.
Report, Hague Conference, 1907.-In the report o:f M.
Louis Renault 1nade to the Hague Peace Conference in
1907 upon the Convention concerning the Rights and
Duties o:f Neutral Powers in Naval War, a:fter commenting on the accepted principle that" The territory o:f neutral States is inviolable", M. Renault says:
Generally speaking, it may be said belligerents should abstain
from any act which, if it were tolerated by the neutral state,
would constitute failure in its duties of neutrality. It is important, however, to say here that a neutral's duty is not necessarily
measured by a belligerent's duty; and this is in harmony with
the nature of the circumstances. An absolute obligation can be
imposed upon a belligerent to refrain from certain acts in the
waters of a neutral state; it is easy for it and _in all cases
possible to fulfill this obligation whether harbors or territorial
waters are concerned. On the other hand, the neutral state
cannot be obliged to prevent or check all the acts that a belligerent might do or wish to do, because very often the neutral state
will not be in a position to fulfill such an obligation. It cannot
know all that is happening in its waters and it cannot be in
readiness to prevent it. The duty exists only to the degree that
it can be known and discharged. (Proceedings of The Hague
Peace Conferences, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
vol. I, p. 291.)

The report prepared by Mr. Renault referring to
article 5 which prohibits the use o:f neutral waters as a
base o:f operations, and recognizing that this article is
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based on the second rule of the 'rreaty of
says:

'Vashington,

\Vhile the principle is easily stated, its applications require
much care. \Ve limit o~rselves to giving one example by prohibiting a belligerent to erect on neutral territory a wireless
telegraphy station or any apparatus for the purpose of cmnnlunicating with a belligerent force on land or sea. The same~
provision occurs in the draft Regulations respecting the rights
and duties of neutral States in war on land. The two provisions
correspond exactly, for con1munication may be made from neutral
territory either with an anny or with a fleet.
\Ve cannot expect to prevent the captain of a belligerent ship·
from communicating with the inhabitants or the consul of his
country, or from using telegraph or telephone cables of the
neutral country. There is a formal provision to this effect in
Article 8 of the draft regulations on land warfare already referred to. It was suggested that we forbid making a neutral
vort a place for concentration or rendezvo-us. But it is hard todefine what this would 1nean, and it would be almost impossible
for neutral States to deal with the intention which brings a
belligerent Yessel into their waters. The interest in this question
will be greatly dilninished by the fixing of the maximum number
of belligerent ships that may stay in a port at the same time.
(Ibid., p. 293.)
1?~e

Tinos, 1917.-The German Yessel Tinos and other

vessels seized in the waters of Greece in September 1916
'\'l;ere declared good prize by the French Court in N oven1ber 1917. It was argued for the Germans that the waters
of Greece \Vere at the time of the seizure of the vessels
neutral waters. The French court considered that
Grecian territory had already been used by the Ger1nan
forces in contravention of the la·ws of neutrality and had
in consequence become an area of hostilities and lost its
neutral status as regards the specific seizures before the
court.
Considerant, dans ces conditions, que, sans avoir a apprecier ici,
<1u point de vue de la neutralite, !'attitude du governement royal
nlors au pouvoir en Grece, il suffit de constater qu'en fait la
succession d'actes d'hostilites accomplis par les ennemis dans les
eaux et le territoire de la Gr,ece a transforme ceux-ci en un
theAtre de la guerre et leur a enleve de facto le benefice d'une
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nPutralite que les navires ennetnis pretendraient vainement inyoquer aujourd' hui. (Journal Officiel, 9 January, 1918, 401.)
ca·ses are possible in which a part, or the whole of the territory of a neutral State falls within the region of war. These·
cases arise in wars in which such neutral territories are the
very objects of the war, as were I{orea (then an independent
State) and the Chinese province of 1\:Ianchuria in the RussoJapanese War; or when a neutral State, either deliberately, or
because it has not at its disposal sufficiently strong naval f0rces,
does. not prevent a belligerent from committing hostilities in its
territorial waters and making them a basis for military operations
and preparations. These territorial waters become in consequence a part of the region of war, and the other belligerent may
also commit hostilities there. (2 Oppenheim, International Law,
4th ed., p. 146.)

Disturbed conditions in Danzig, 1931.-For several
years the use of the port of Danzig by Polish warships
had been a 1natter disturbing the relations bet,veen the
Free City of Danzig and Poland. 'fhe Danzig Government had 1naintained that Polish vessels of war were
bound by the same international regulations as foreign
vessels of war under other flags.
The report by Danzig in regard to Danzig-Polish relations during the 2¥2 months before August 14, 1931,
states:
As regards military measures, the Danzig-Polish relations sin<:e
the last session of the Council have been specially aggravated l)y
the fact that on July 1st last, after the expiry of the Agreement
concerning the access of Polish warships to the port of Danzig,
Poland suddenly and without any special reason sent patrols of
Polish sailors through the streets of Danzig and thereby created~
as will readily be understood, great excitement among the Danzig
population. The latter regarded those measures as highly provocative, and the Government of the Free City was obliged to apply
to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for a decision
under Article 39 of the Paris Treaty of November 9th, 1920.
(Permanent Court of International Justice, series C, no. 55, p. 41.)

In a report of August 15, 1931, the High Commissionerof Danzig says, in part,
At its meeting on May 22nd, 1931, the Council of the League of
Nations invited me "to submit a further report on the situation
3628-34--4
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tor the next session of the Council." I accordingly have the
honour to follow up my report of April 25th, 1931, by submitting
the present report to the Council :
On my return to Danzig at the end of 1\Iay, I soon noted that
the agitation caused by the deplorable incidents between Danzig
citizens and Poles which occurred during April and to which I
considered it my duty to draw the Council's attention in a special
report had subsided to some extent. Unfortunately, I found that
the general situation at Danzig was not so satisfactory; disturbances owing to party strife were still continuing. During the
month of June, particularly violent clashes occurred between the
organizations of the extremist parties even in the centre of the
town, and, if they had spread, they would have constituted a
very serious menace to public security. (Permanent Court of
International Justice, series C, no. 55, 1931. Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig of Polish War Vessels, p. 14.)

The question referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion was :
Do the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, Part III, Section XI, the
Danzig-Polish r.rreaty concluded at Paris on November 9th, 1920,
and the relevant decisions of the Council of the League of Nations and of the High Commissioner, confer upon Poland rights
or attributions as regards the access to, or anchorage in, the
port and waterways of Danzig of Polish war vessels? If so,
what are these rights or attributions? (Ibid., p. 9.)

Attitude of Cuba, 1914.-Cuba, in an early decree in
the World War on August 10, 1914, stated, " It is forbidden for a belligerent to make use of a wirelesstelegraphy apparatus belonging to the Government."
Swiss regulation, 1914.-By an ordinance of August 2,
1914, Switzerland took action at the beginning of the
World War to maintain strict neutrality in the use of
radio. The ordinance was issued in accordance with
proposals of the military department as follows :
1. The creation of new radio stations is forbidden on
all territory of the Swiss Confederation.
ART. 2. The utilization of radio stations which already exist
and have obtained a concession is forbidden. The organs of the
telegraph and telephone administration will render the stations
incapable of use without delay by removing the receiving apJ>aratus, if there is any, or the parts indispensable for their use.
ARTIOLE
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The parts of the apparatus removed are to be preserved by
the telegraph and telephone administration.
ART. 3. There are not included in this prohibition stations established by the telegraph and telephone administration, or those
which have been established for the needs of the army.
ART. 4. Violations of the present provisions, if there has been
a reception or sending of news of any nature whatever, will be
proceeded against according to the penal provisions established
against those who spread, intentionally or by negligence, news of
a military nature. If there has been only the illegal establishment of a station or the maintenance of an existing station, of
which it bas not been proved that it bas been used, the penalty
will consist in a fine and the station will be immediately closed.
If there is reason to suspect that the station is intended to be
used as a means of information for the benefit of a foreign State,
proceedings for espionage will be commenced. (1916, Naval
'Var College, Int. Law Topics, p. 68.)

Article 14 of the ordinance of August 4, 1914, laid
down explicit prohibitions as to use:
It is absolutely forbidden to the belligerent parties to establish
or use on Swiss territory a radio station or any other· installation
(telephone, telegraph, signal station, optical or other, carrier
pigeon station, aviation station, etc.), designed to serve as a means
of communication with the belligerent forces on land or sea or
to offer facilities for the same in any manner whatsoever. (Ibid.,
p. 73.)

Action of United States, 1914.-An Executive order
of August 5, 1914, provided that"all radio stations within the jurisdiction of the United States
of America are hereby prohibited from transmitting or receiving
for delivery 111essages of an unneutral nature, and from in anr
way rendering to any one of the belligerents any unneutral service,
during the continuance of hostilities." (1916, Naval War College,
Int. Law Topics, p. 87.)

A further order of September 5, 1914, was concerned
with high-powered stations capable of trans-Atlantic
transmission and it was provided that these " shall be
taken over by the Government of the United States and
used or controlled by it to the exclusion of any other
control." (Ibid., p. 91.) The Secretary o£ the Navy was
to enforce these orders. Radio installations in the Pan-
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atua Canal Zone and 'vaters were to be used only on

Canal business. (Ibid., p. 99.)
Oolo1nbian attitude, L914-15.-During the World "'\Var,
problems arose as to the use o:f radio stations alreadyestablished on Colombian territory. One company was
o'vnecl by a belligerent, one station "\vas Colombian property, and one wa·s owned by a neutral company. A res-olution of July 14, 1915, provided as to these stations
'""'hich had been the subject of much discussion and
negotiation since the outbreak o:f the "'\Vorld War that-1. The radio station of Cartagena 'vill continue, subject to the

nwasures previously adopted for preventing its use, under the
inspection and supervision of the official Colombian expert and
the local political authorities. If these authorities, in accord
with the expert, consider new orders or new measures necessary
for the better assurance of the neutrality of the Republic, they
will decree them on their own authority in urgent cases and in
ordinary cases will consult this n1inistry. The home of the
German employees who previously 'vorked in the station will not
be troubled, although this home be near the place of the radio
apparatus, the use of this apparatus continuing to be absolutely
in1possible.
2. The station of San Andres will remain closed for a time and
in the manner which will be indicated by the competent 1ninistry.
3. The station of Santa Marta: can continue to exercise its:
rights, but subject always to the departmental and national authorities; but it can not have in its service individuals of the
nationality of any of the belligerents. (1916, Naval 'Var College,
Int. Law Topics, p. 46.)

(/o7nm,ission of Jurists, 1923.-The practices and regu-lations during the vVorld War showed the need for reglllation. The Washington Conference on the Limitation
of Arma1nent recommended the appointment of a con11uission to consider ne"; agencies of warfare. This Coin1nission of Jurists, meeting at The Hague, reported February 19, 1923, upon rules in regard to radio and in
regard to aerial "\varfare. Referring to article 8 of the1907 Hague Convention n1entioned above,. th.e Report of·
the Co1nmission says,
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out while article 8 stipulates that a neutral Power is not bound
to forbid or restrict the use of wireless installations by a belligertent, and article 9 relates to the restrictive or preventive measures
taken by a neutral Power for this purpose, measures which must
be applied impartially to the belligerents,~ article 4 [of the Commission's rules follo\ving] imposes on neutral Powers the duty
of preventing the transmission by radio of any information destined for a belligerent concerning military forces or 1nilitary
operations.
This article is a compromise. On one side one Delegation
pointed out that the 1907 system had stood the test during the
war when neutral Governments had taken under article 9 of
the 1907 Convention restrictive or preventive measures which
were quite satisfactory. On the other side it was pointed out
that those n1easures had been taken precisely for the purpose
of complying with the obligation imposed by neutrality, and that
it would be well to define this obligation so as to help and protect
neutral Powers in preventing the violation of their neutrality and
thereby reducing the probability of their becoming involved in
the war. Agreement was reached on the basis of a text indicating exactly the character of the messages prohibited, viz.,
messages concerning military forces and military operations. It
is understood that the prohibition would not cover the repetition
of ne\vs which has already becotne public.
It has been agreed that the article does not render necessary
the institution of a censorship iu every neutral country in every
war. 'l'he character of the war and the situation of the neutral
country n1ay render such 1neasures unnecessary. It goes without
saying that neutral Governments are bound to use the means at
their disposal to prevent the transmission of the information ln
question.
The second paragraph ~erely reproduces the first paragraph
of article 9 of the Convention of 1907. The phrase ''destined for
a belligerent " covers all cases where the information is intended
to reach the belligerent, and not merely messages which are
addressed to the belligerent.
ARTICLE

4.

A neutral Power is not called upon to restrict or prohibit the
use of radio stations which are located within its jurisdiction,
except so far as may be necessary to prevent the transmission of
information destined for a belligerent concerning military forces
·Or military operations and except as prescribed by article 5.

48

BELLIGERENTS IN NEUTRAL WATERS

All restrictive or prohibitive measures taken by a neutral
Power shall be applied impartially by it to the belligerents.
(1924, Naval War College, Int. Law Documents, p. 100.)

Article 5 of the Commission's report here referred to
is as follows :
ARTICLE

5.

Belligerent mobile radio stations are bound within the jurisdiction of a neutral state to abstain from all use of their radio
apparatus. Neutral Governments are bound to employ the means
at their disposal to prevent such use. (Ibid., p. 101.)

Responsibility of a state for radio.-The responsibility
of Canada for radio was raised in a case which went by
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The questions shortly stated were :
(1) Has the Parliament ot Canada jurisdiction to regulate
and control radio communication? (2) If not, in what particulars is the jurisdiction limited?
(In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in
Canada. (1932) A.C. 304.)

In the course of the decision it was said:
Canada as a Dominion is one of the signatories to the convention. In a question with foreign powers the persons who might
ir~fringe some of the stipulations in the convention would not
be the Dominion of Canada as a whole but would be individual
persons residing in Canada. These persons must so to speak be
kept in order by legislation and the only legislation that can deal
with them all at once is Dominion legislation. (Ibid., 312.)
* * * The result is in their Lord~hips' opinion clear. It is
Canada as a whole which is amenable to the other powers for the
proper carrying out of the convention; and to preYent individuals
in Canada infringing the stipulations of the convention it is
necessary that the Dominion should pass le,gislation which should
apply to all the dwellers in Canada. (Ibid., 313.)

Oontrol of oommwnications.-In time of 'var a belligerent may control communications within its o'vn area
to the extent 'vhich it deems essential 'vith due regard
for its obligations under international la'v and treaties.
This right has led to various degrees of censorship in
recent years and to the resort to practices of doubtful
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legality. Even in the Spanish-A1nerican War, 1898, the
United States n1aintained the right to prohibit all cipher
messages regardless of source or destination.
The control of com1nunications by neutrals must necessarily be com1nensurate with neutral responsibility, but
the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the ;Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Cases of War
on Land in article 8 states that:
A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use
on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or
of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to Companies
or private individuals. (1908, Naval War College, Int. Law
Situations, p. 190.)

Neutral po\vers did, however, restrict the use of radio
by belligerents in the 1Vorld V\Tar, 1914-18.
Basic considerations.-The Xane may follow the
Young into port of B. Under normal conditions it must
refrain from acts 'vhich, if kno·wingly permitted by B,,
would constitute a nonfulfillment of neutrality-specifically, such as capture or visit and search, or pursuit jn
the technical sense.
Under abnormal conditions, when the neutral state is
admittedly unable to maintain its neutrality, a belligerent must take such n1easures as are essential to security
of its forces, as being the only competent authority in
the area.
The Nine-Po"Ter '.rreaty of the Washington Conference, 1921-22, envisages the mutual obligation of the
belligerent to respect, and of the neutral to maintain,
neutrality:
ARTICLE VI. The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree
fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to
which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is
8 neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.
(1921,
Naval War College, Int. Law Documents, p. 349-.)

As the rights and obligations of the neutral are reciprocal, and if the neutral is not able to fulfill its obligations, the belligerent must to that extent be free to take
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Ineasures essential to its protection, for in neutral waters,
the belligerent obligation to refrain from hostile action
is based upon presumption of local protection against
belligerent acts on the part of the enemy forces.
Manifestly such action should not be beyond 'v hat
'vould be justified upon the high sea 'vhere an enemy
1nerchant vessel unarmed and engaged merely in regular
co1nmerce would be liable under ordinary conditions to
capture only. Within neutral jurisdiction capture would
be justified only upon grounds that would imply that
the mere presence of the merchant vessel of Y in the
port of B endangered the cruiser of X. As the authorities of B are unable to protect the cruiser of X, in case
of evident risk the com1nander of the cruiser is under
obligation to take the action that he might otherwise
call upon the authorities of B to take. The only method
by which the con1mander can inform himself as to the
character of the merchant vessel of Y is by visit and
search which would be with view to assuring his safety.
If by visit and search he finds the Young is armed
and equipped to cruise against state X, he "\Vould act
accordingly. State B would in no appreciable degree
be injured, by taking from one of its ports, where it
'vas i1npotent, a vessel 'vhich might endanger the peace
of the port or threaten the safety of a friendly state;
while on the other hand interference "\vithin its ports
with commerce which would disturb the course of its
trade 'vould be unjustifiable and a ground for reparation.
The recent development and use of radio at the
ti1ne of the formulation of the Hague Conventions in
1907 naturally left 1nany 1natters for regulation by subsequent action. The use of radio in the Russo-Japanese
war, 1904-5, had given rise to a few problems for so1ne
of which the Hague Conventions made provisions. The
1907 Hague Convention (V) concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of 'V ar
on Land embodies certain prohibitions.
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ARTICLE 3. Belligerents are likewise forbidden to:
(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless
telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;
(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely
military purposes, and \vhich has not been opened for the service
of public messages.
ARTICLE 8. A neutral power is not called upon to forbid or
restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to ·
it or to Companies or private individuals.
ARTICLE 9. Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by
a neutral Power in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7
and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents.
A neutral Power must see to the same obligations being observed by Companies or priva~e individuals owning telegraph
or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus. (1908,
Nanll \Var College, Int. Law Situations, pp. 180-190.)

The 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War also
covered certain relations of radio telegraphy:
Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as
a base of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for
the purpose of communicating with the belligerent forces on land
or sea. {Ibid., p. 215.)

During the 'Vorld War, 1914-18, however, the neutral
control of radio became much extended. The United
States, by an Executive Order of President Wilson, took
OVer SOlne of the high-power radio stations and placed
them under control of the Navy, and regulations were
prescribed to assure the Govern1nent that messages of an
unmistakably neutral character only should be transmitted by these stations.
SOLUTION

(a) The X ane should take no action against the
Y oting merely because the 17 oung has entered the port
of B. In case the X ane is convinced that the Y ourng is.
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abusing its privileges in B because of the "\Veakness of the
local authorities, the X ane may visit and search the
Young as a basis for determining subsequent action.
(b) If the Y arrrow remains in port more than 24
hours, unless for the lawful taking on of coal or supplies
or making repairs to render the ship seaworthy, the comrnander of the X mne may request the authorities of state
B to intern the Y arrow1.
(c) The commander of the Xane should protest
against military use of radio and if no competent local
authority is present, should take such measures as 1nay
be least arbitrary to prevent its use.

